Yemen’s Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis, has expanded its cooperation with non-state actors in Somalia, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Shabab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). Despite ideological and strategic differences, these groups share common adversaries—namely, the United States and Israel—and rely on asymmetric warfare and illicit economies. Their collaboration aims to enhance supply chains, access advanced weaponry, improve their standing domestically, and extend their influence over key maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab Strait. As a result, regional instability has intensified.

​

Pragmatism Over Ideology

The Horn of Africa, particularly the Red Sea littoral states, holds strategic importance for Yemen due to its proximity and extensive coastline. This has historically shaped migration, trade, and cultural exchanges. Yemen’s engagement with Somalia dates back to its 2003 establishment of the Sanaa Cooperation Forum, its mediation efforts during the Somali crisis (2006–2007), and its acceptance of large numbers of Somali refugees. Additionally, Yemen has served as a gateway between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. In 2023 alone, human trafficking networks facilitated the crossing of nearly 97,000 people from Somalia into Yemen.

​

The Role of Arms Smuggling

Weapons trafficking in the Red Sea has played a significant role in Ansar Allah’s growing ties with Somalia. Despite a UN arms embargo on Yemen, Iran has clandestinely supplied weapons to the group. Between 2015 and 2023, naval forces from the U.S., Saudi Arabia, France, and Australia intercepted 16 vessels carrying approximately 29,000 small arms, 365 anti-tank missiles, and over 2.3 million rounds of ammunition bound for Ansar Allah. Many of these weapons traveled via dhows used for coastal trade and fishing. A 2020 report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime confirmed that some Iranian-supplied arms to Ansar Allah ended up in Somalia.

​

Iran’s Strategic Influence

Iran has maintained a fluctuating yet significant presence in the Horn of Africa, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) prioritizing the region since 1989. Tehran has used alliances in Africa to break international isolation, establish supply routes for its proxies, and expand its strategic reach. Iran supported Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s rise in 1989, armed the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia in 2006, and sought a military presence in Eritrea in 2008 to facilitate weapons transfers to Ansar Allah.

​

Over the past decade, Ansar Allah’s connections with Somali non-state actors have deepened, primarily through arms traffickers and intermediaries. Since 2016, Ansar Allah has sought maritime operational capabilities, a strategy it employed during the Red Sea crisis over Gaza beginning in 2023. The group’s leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, reiterated this approach in January 2025, highlighting Ansar Allah’s maritime operations on behalf of Gaza and its support for anti-Western resistance movements in Africa.

​

Al-Shabab and ISS: Expanding Collaboration

Reports from the United Nations and the U.S. government indicate that al-Shabab and Ansar Allah have increased their coordination. In mid-2024, representatives of both groups met in Somalia to negotiate arms transfers and technical expertise. Under the agreement, Ansar Allah would supply al-Shabab with weapons in exchange for an escalation of piracy and ransom collection in the Gulf of Aden. Given al-Shabab’s established cooperation with Somali pirates, this partnership is likely aimed at maximizing maritime disruptions. The U.S. government has expressed concerns that such collaboration could provide Ansar Allah with new financial resources while granting al-Shabab access to more sophisticated weaponry.

 

Iran has also maintained longstanding ties with al-Shabab, assisting the group in circumventing UN sanctions through the use of Iranian ports for re-exporting charcoal. Additionally, Iran has reportedly funded and armed al-Shabab to target U.S. interests in the Horn of Africa. U.S. intelligence is investigating potential Iranian involvement in fostering ties between Ansar Allah and al-Shabab, with some analysts suggesting Iran plays a central role in these interactions.

​

Meanwhile, Ansar Allah’s relationship with ISS has evolved since at least 2021, primarily involving the transfer of small arms. Between 2015 and 2022, ISS members smuggled arms from Yemen, indicating existing connections with Ansar Allah. By late 2023, Ansar Allah sought to leverage ISS’s regional networks for intelligence gathering in the Gulf of Aden. In return, it provided ISS with drones and technical training. Security forces in Somalia’s Puntland region intercepted five drones linked to Ansar Allah in August 2024, further confirming these exchanges.

​

Maritime Security and Regional Instability

The growing ties between Ansar Allah, al-Shabab, and ISS pose significant risks to global maritime trade and security. Their common interests have reshaped security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, complicating international efforts to curb arms smuggling and piracy. Iran has benefited from this evolving collaboration, gaining leverage over a critical international sea lane.

​

Iran, along with these militant groups, exploits illicit networks, including arms and fuel trafficking. Weapons shipments often follow complex routes, with large vessels departing Iran, skirting international naval patrols near the Gulf of Aden, and traveling to East African waters before reaching Somalia. From there, smaller boats smuggle arms into Yemen, bypassing sanctions. Somali arms dealers have also been involved in attempts to procure surface-to-air missile systems from Eastern Europe for Ansar Allah.

​

For Ansar Allah, Somalia’s porous coastlines serve as crucial supply routes, ensuring access to Iranian weapons and technology. Iranian-backed smuggling operations facilitate the transfer of drones, missiles, and other military equipment through Somali ports, including Bosaso and Berbera. These shipments sustain Ansar Allah’s expanding drone and missile program, which has increasingly targeted international shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Broader Strategic Implications

​

The deepening alliance between these groups also provides Iran with a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa, allowing it to influence maritime security in the region. During the Gaza conflict, Iran and Ansar Allah sought to use Somali-based attacks to exert pressure on global shipping. Although these plans were curtailed by setbacks in Iran’s conflict with Israel, reports suggest that Ansar Allah and its allies continue to explore new maritime attack strategies.

​

The rise in Somali piracy coinciding with Ansar Allah’s Red Sea disruptions further suggests coordinated efforts. Reports indicate that a third of Ansar Allah’s maritime attacks in 2024 occurred outside its radar coverage, implying that external actors—possibly Somali groups, the IRGC, or Russia—provided intelligence on ship movements.

​

Additionally, Ansar Allah’s support for al-Shabab and ISS has fueled regional instability. The transfer of advanced weaponry, including suicide drones, has enhanced the asymmetric warfare capabilities of these groups, increasing threats to security forces in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. These developments complicate counterterrorism efforts in the region and divert Western military resources.

​

Conclusion

Ansar Allah’s growing footprint in Somalia aligns with Iran’s broader objectives in the Horn of Africa. Tehran has actively sought to strengthen its influence in the region, restoring diplomatic ties with Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia. As international sanctions on Ansar Allah tighten, its reliance on illicit smuggling networks is expected to increase.

Iran’s strategic calculations have been reinforced by Ansar Allah’s role in disrupting maritime trade and security. Tehran views the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea as critical theaters in its broader confrontation with the West. As long as regional instability persists, Iran and its proxies will continue leveraging alliances with non-state actors to challenge international security frameworks. However, ideological divergences between Sunni and Shiite militant groups may eventually test the durability of these alliances.